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Abstract 
The global economic and financial crisis, which broke out in 2008, had a significant impact on 
European countries and, consequently, on its fiscal and budgetary decisions in the various policy 
areas. Security and Defence were no exception. Although the fact that the international security 
context continues to require a proper response to a set of transnational and sub-national risks and 
threats, the European countries decided to adapt their budgets to an environment of economic crisis, 
namely by applying austerity measures to its defence structures. This article analysis the impact of 
these austerity measures in four southern European countries – Portugal, Spain, Italy and Greece – 
arguing that, despite national particularities, there are some common trends regarding the Defence and 
Armed Forces sector: the decline in Defence expenditure; an overall reduction in manpower, both 
civilian and military; the decrease of investment, procurement and R&D; and a reduction of military 
peacekeeping deployments. In order to overcome the consequences that the economic crisis had in the 
European Union Defence dimension, this article argues that the current context should be taken as an 
opportunity. At the national level, through the promotion of structural reforms of the Defence and 
Armed Forces that allow to maintain the same level of ambition, but with optimizing resources. At the 
European Union level, Defence cooperation should be seen as the better way to improve capabilities in 
any level of spending, either through overall common instruments or through sub-regional security and 
defence cooperation mechanisms.  
Keywords 
European Defence; Southern Europe; Austerity; Cooperation 
 
 1 
Introduction
*
 
The global economic and financial crisis, which broke out in 2008, had a significant impact on 
European countries and, consequently, on its fiscal and budgetary decisions in the various policy 
areas. Security and Defence were no exception. Despite the fact that the international security context 
continues to require a proper response to a set of transnational and sub-national risks and threats – 
including regional instability, namely in the broader Middle East and North Africa; arms and nuclear 
proliferation; cyber-attacks; various extremist and terrorist movements; organised crime and human 
trafficking; and potential natural disasters –, the European countries decided to adapt their budgets to 
an environment of economic crisis, namely by applying austerity measures to its defence structures. 
With decreasing resources but the same (or even growing) needs, all European countries were 
forced to think on how to obtain better results at any level of spending – personnel, investment and 
operations/maintenance – and reducing the impact of major expenditure cuts. This trend has been 
pursued at two levels: at the national level, most European countries started a process of adjustments 
and reforms within the defence structure aiming at more efficient organizational arrangements; at the 
European level, through the promotion of a better cooperation between countries, namely regarding 
common projects (including force generation and investment), both at the NATO and European Union 
(EU) level. As an example of this international cooperation, the Atlantic Alliance started a 
comprehensive debate on a new way of thinking about generating modern defence capabilities, the so-
called ‘smart defence’ concept, with the aim of encouraging Allies to cooperate in developing, 
acquiring and maintaining military capabilities. The same as been done within the EU’s Common 
Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), namely through the promotion of the ‘pooling and sharing’ 
concept in the European Defence Agency (EDA) framework. Most EU countries, notably those who 
are also NATO’s members, must now look for the best way of profiting from the cooperation’s 
mechanisms within the two organizations, in a logic of complementarity and aiming to improve its 
operational response, particularly in international missions. 
Since 2010, real defence spending in Europe has declined at a compound annual growth rate of 
1.9%, with reductions of 3.0% in 2011, 2.2% in 2012 and 2.4% in 2013. Overall, real defence-
spending levels were 7.4% lower than in 2010
1
. Despite this general trend, at the national level, the 
evolution of defence budgets is different across Europe, in three major trends. The first corresponds to 
the countries that increased its military spending. Only ten out of 37 European states increased their 
defence expenditures, including Poland (14.8%) – which is seeking to increase the number of the 
country’s deployable troops and to become an even more active participant, particularly in the 
NATO’s framework – Bulgaria (10.2%) Norway (9.1%) and Turkey (5.4%)2. 
A second trend concerns to the three major spenders in Western Europe – the UK, France and 
Germany – that have made small reductions in military spending since 2008, in each case by less than 
5% in real terms. However, in 2010, the UK presented its Strategic Defence and Security Review 
(SDSR)
3
 and planned to reduce its defence budget by 7.5% over four years, although in practice the 
cuts may have been deeper. Germany has planned to cut around 10% in its military expenditure by 
                                                     
*
 This paper follows a previous contribution to the LSE Ideas Special Report on “A Strategy for Southern Europe” 
(October 2013), with a revised version and updated data after 2013. 
1
 The Military Balance 2013: The Annual Assessment of Global Military Capabilities and Defence Economics. 
Oxfordshire: Routledge, 2014, p. 63. 
2
 The Military Balance 2013: The Annual Assessment of Global Military Capabilities and Defence Economics. 
Oxfordshire: Routledge, 2014, p. 63. 
3
 Cf. “Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The Strategic Defence and Security Review”, October 2010, available at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-strategic-defence-and-security-review-securing-britain-in-an-age-of-
uncertainty. 
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2015 (compared to 2011). And France, which presented its White Paper on Defence in 2013
4
, is 
planning to maintain roughly constant spending in real terms.  
Finally, a third trend corresponds to the Southern European countries, which have made the largest 
cuts and significantly reduced their defence budgets since the beginning of the crisis, with particular 
large decreases in Greece (-42%), Spain (-19.6%) and Italy (-15.8%)
5
. 
Nevertheless the budgetary constraints, the EU-28 member-states are still one of the largest 
defence spenders in the world. Even if most European countries spent – prior to the economic crisis – 
less than 2% of their GDP on defence
6
. 
Defence spending in Southern Europe 
In the context of the Euro crisis, the Southern European countries are among the most badly affected. 
They faced, first, serious sovereign debt problems in the wake of the banking crisis and a long period 
of economic recession. Like Ireland, Portugal and Greece were forced to ask for international financial 
assistance. Spain and Italy were not formally obliged to apply for it, but all four Southern European 
countries face very similar problems: high deficits, rising debts and deep economic recessions. To 
fulfil the terms of the bailouts, or simply to restore the markets’ confidence, all these countries 
adopted fiscal consolidation policies as the first priority and approved harsh austerity measures. These 
austerity programs have heavily affected not only the Welfare State, but also core functions of 
sovereignty including, above all, Defence. 
Since 2008, military expenditures show a significant decrease in southern European countries, 
where the cuts reached the highest levels in Europe. This trend had obvious effects on the most 
important sectors of the Defence Ministries and Armed Forces: personnel, investment
7
 and 
deployment. 
Defence Spending (millions of Euros) 
 
  2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Italy 26 964 26 631 20 932 22 631 21 946 21 637 21 741 20 600 
Spain 10 500 11 506 12 219 12 756 12 196 11 132 10 059 10 828 
Greece 4 956 5 240 5 579 6 192 6 023 4 756 3 604 3 272 
Portugal 2 532 2 452 2 403 2 536 2 671 2 782 2 699 2 366 
Source: Information gathered by the authors according to the European Defence Agency (EDA) Defence Data Portal, 
available at http://www.eda.europa.eu/info-hub/defence-data-portal. 
Still, it should be highlighted that the political and budgetary options, in the different Southern 
European countries, are not homogenous. One of the major reasons is the weight that defence 
industries have in Italian and Spanish economies, compared with Portugal and Greece. Italy's military 
industrial base is ranked fourth in Europe and fifth in the world
8
, with Finmeccanica
9
 – the country’s 
                                                     
4
 Cf. “White Paper on Defence 2013”, available at http://www.defense.gouv.fr/actualites/articles/livre-blanc-2013.  
5
 The Military Balance 2013: The Annual Assessment of Global Military Capabilities and Defence Economics. 
Oxfordshire: Routledge, 2014, p. 63. 
6
 We should recall that all NATO members are committed in spending, at least, 2% of their GDP in military expenditure. 
7
 The investment dimension of national defence budgets includes not only new equipment procurement and R&D 
expenditure, but also the modernization processes of equipment already in use.  
8
 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Sipri Yearbook 2012 Armaments, Disarmament and International 
Security. Oxford University Press, 2012, p. 248. According to the SIPRI Top 100 arms-producing and military services 
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major defence company – having, in 2011, a total of 24,074 million dollars of total sales and around 
70,470 employees. The Spanish military industrial base is ranked tenth in the world and sixth in 
Europe
10
, with emphasis on the stake that the country has in EADS one of the aircraft global leading 
companies
11
. These means that any major cut in military investment projects in Italy and Spain will 
have direct effects on their national economies and, consequently, will aggravate the domestic 
economic crisis environment. Although all Southern European countries have made cuts in every area 
of military spending, this could explain why the Spanish and Italian governments would choose to cut, 
primarily, on personnel and operations/maintenance rather than on investment programmes, whereas 
Portugal and Greece
12
 could find major cuts, with a transversal scope, across all defence expenditure. 
This also means that these countries have different approaches regarding international cooperation 
in defence industrial initiatives. Italy and Spain can use their industrial basis to participate and lead 
transnational cooperation projects, either in EU and NATO’s framework, while Portugal and Greece 
are limited to potential expertise niches. These differences, that support some of the political choices 
made in the framework the budgetary constraints, may also be important in defining each country’s 
international strategies in security and defence issues. 
Portugal 
Since 2005, and across the crisis, Portugal shows relatively constant military spending of around 2,500 
million euros. Between 2008 and 2010 Defence expenditure grows, even slightly, up to nearly 2,700 
million euros, which meant a total of 1.6% of the GDP. Since then, however, and under the strong 
pressure of austerity policies, the military expenditure decreased from 2699 million euros in 2011 to 
2366 million euros in 2012, which represents 1.4% of the GDP
13
.These cuts had immediate 
consequences and, in the framework of the so-called ‘reform of the State’ process, the Portuguese 
government launched a new reform of the Defence and Armed Forces. 
Regarding personnel, in 2003 (when Portugal changed from a military system based on 
conscription to a professional army) Portuguese Armed Forces had already been substantially reduced. 
In 2010 the number stood at 38,000 troops across the three branches of the Armed Forces. However, 
the personnel expenditure still represents 74% of the total defence expenditures in 2013
14
. In order to 
optimise the defence budget structure, the on-going reform
15
, taking into account the established level 
of ambition, points to a reduction of about 8,000 troops and a total number for the Armed Forces of 
about 30,000 military. 
(Contd.)                                                                  
companies (available at http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/production/Top100) Italy has 7 companies 
among the top 100 arms producing corporations in the world: Finmeccanica (8), Agusta Westland (24), Alenia 
Aeronatica (49), Fincantieri (63), Selex Galileo (75), MBDA Italia (90) and Avio (93). 
9
 Finmeccanica is one of the largest industrial and high-tech group in Italy, the 8th major defence company in the world 
and the third in the European Union (after the British BAE Systems and the European consortium EADS). 
10
 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Sipri Yearbook 2012 Armaments, Disarmament and International 
Security. Oxford University Press, 2012, p.248. 
11
 According to the SIPRI Top 100 arms-producing and military services companies (available at 
http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/production/Top100) Spain has 3 companies among the top 100 arms 
producing corporations in the world: EADS (21), Navantia (55) and Indra (94). 
12
 Neither Portugal or Greece have any military company in SIPRI Top 100 arms-producing and military services 
companies. 
13
 According to the European Defence Agency (EDA) Defence Data Portal, available at http://www.eda.europa.eu/info-
hub/defence-data-portal. 
14
 NATO Public Diplomacy Division, Financial and Economic Data Relating to NATO Defence. Communique 
PR/CP(2014)028, 24 February 2014. 
15
 Cf. Instituto da Defesa Nacional, A Defesa Nacional no contexto da reforma das funções de soberania do Estado. IDN, 
Janeiro de 2013. Available at http://www.idn.gov.pt/index.php?mod=008&cod=13032013x2.  
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Concerning investment, there is also a clear decreasing path: from 364 million euros in 2009 to 255 
Million euros in 2012. This meant a fall from 14% to around 11% of the total military expenditure. 
But the trend is getting worse. In the following years, in order that the Ministry of Defence would 
meet, both, the budget targets and the financial commitments with arm suppliers, it was forced to find 
a solution to the on-going military modernization programs: to postpone payments to arm suppliers; 
and freeze or suspend some programs, some of which were already underway, like those of NH90 
helicopters and the PANDUR II 8/8 armoured vehicles. 
Finally, the cuts have also negative effects at the operational level, namely in the participation of 
the Portuguese Armed Forces in international peacekeeping missions. Although with slight 
fluctuations, the decreasing tendency of overseas deployment is similar to other Southern European 
countries. In 2008 Portugal had a total of about 700 troops abroad, which in 2012 have been reduced 
to about 468. In 2012, the withdrawal from UNIFIL (Lebanon) and the reduction of about 50% in 
ISAF (Afghanistan) was compensated by the presence of the Portuguese navy in EUNAVFOR 
Atalanta in Somalia. In 2013 the Portuguese presence in military peace missions was of about 550 
military
16
. 
Portugal 
 
  2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Defence Spending (millions) 2 532 2 452 2 403 2 536 2 671 2 782 2 699 2 366 
Investment (millions)  157 289 344 364 296 305 255 
Military peace operations 721 822 696 692 680 549 836 468 
Number in Armed Forces 47 215 37 577 40 855 37 346 39 568 38 927 35 254 33 446 
Source: Information gathered by the authors according to the European Defence Agency (EDA) Defence Data Portal and The 
Military Balance 2012 and 2013. 
 
                                                     
16
 Estado-Maior-General das Forças Armadas, Mapa de Missões. Available at http://www.emgfa.pt/pt/operacoes/mapa. 
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Spain 
Among all countries of southern Europe, Spain is the one that shows a larger and more abrupt 
reduction of the military expenditures. And the reason is simple: between 2000 and 2008, under a 
period of economic growth, Spain developed a policy of international standing and increased, 
exponentially, its military spending in about 29%, being one of the biggest in Western Europe. The 
crisis, however, had an immediate impact on Defence expenditure, and between 2008 and 2012 the 
budget decreased by about 19.6%, which represents1% of the GDP
17
. 
Since 2008 these cuts had strong consequences for the Ministry of Defence and the Armed Forces. 
These consequences are, first of all, on personnel: the reduction starts with the civilian personnel of 
the Ministry of Defence and Armed Forces branches and then extends to the military. Personnel 
expenditures have a growing weight in the Defence budget, which represented, in 2012, 57% of the 
total military expenditures
18
. In 2008 the total number in Armed Forces reached 137,800 troops and 
by2012 had fallen to 124,561. This reduction trend continues in the following years, opening an on-
going debate on reducing manpower, in accordance with the necessary adjustments regarding the 
changes in the force structure
19
. 
Secondly, the cuts have consequences on investment. Spain launched, in 2000, an ambitious 
military modernization program with 19 new equipment programs for the three branches of the Armed 
Forces. Since the beginning of the crisis, however, the cuts imposed a downward trend in investment, 
which in 2008 was of 2,850 million euros and, in 2011, was already about 750 million euros, 
recovering in 2012. The cuts have imposed heavy restrictions on compliance with the modernization 
programs and its financial commitments, amounting to 26 billion euros
20
. The solution found by the 
Spanish Ministry of Defence was, on the one hand, to restructure debts to arms suppliers and, on the 
other, to freeze or delay some programs (Typhoon aircraft; A400M transport aircraft)
21
. 
Finally, the spending cuts have consequences for the military operational dimension, with a 
reduction of the overseas deployment and the commitment of the Spanish Armed Forces in 
international peacekeeping missions, either in NATO, EU and UN framework. Spain reached a 
maximum of 3,400 military deployed in 2006; in 2008 had about 3,000 troops abroad and, in 2012, 
had about 2,700 military in international missions. This trend continued with the withdrawal of the 
contingent in UNIFIL (Lebanon) and the planned withdrawal from ISAF (Afghanistan). 
  
                                                     
17
 The Military Balance 2013: The Annual Assessment of Global Military Capabilities and Defence Economics. 
Oxfordshire: Routledge, 2014, p. 63. 
18
 NATO Public Diplomacy Division, Financial and Economic Data Relating to NATO Defence. Communique 
PR/CP(2014)028, 24 February 2014. 
19
 Cf. The Military Balance 2013: The Annual Assessment of Global Military Capabilities and Defence Economics. 
Oxfordshire: Routledge, 2013., p. 95. 
20
 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Sipri Yearbook 2012 Armaments, Disarmament and International 
Security. Oxford University Press, 2012, p.178. 
21
 The Military Balance 2013: The Annual Assessment of Global Military Capabilities and Defence Economics. 
Oxfordshire: Routledge, 2014, p. 63. 
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Spain 
 
  2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Defence Spending (millions) 10 500 11 506 12 219 12 756 12 196 11 132 10 059 10 828 
Number in Armed Forces 119 832 127 000 132 400 137 800 136 000 129 723 126 924 124 561 
Investment (millions)   2 544 2 644 2 851 2 208 1 427 753 2 532 
Military peace operations 2 442 3 400 2 762 3 026 2 378 2 660 3 088 2765 
Source: Information gathered by the authors according to the European Defence Agency (EDA) Defence Data Portal and The 
Military Balance 2012 and 2013. 
 
 
Italy 
The economic and financial crisis had a direct impact on the Italian defence expenditures. SIPRI
22
 
estimates around 16% real-terms drop in Italy military budget between 2008 and 2011, with major 
spending cuts falling on operation/ maintenance, restriction on recruitment and freezing or 
postponement of equipment programs. In 2008, Italy had a defence expenditure of 22,600 million 
euros (corresponding to 1,4% of the GDP), comparing with 20,600 in 2012 (corresponding 1,3% of 
the GDP). However, the first major budget reduction occurred in 2006-2007, moving from a defence 
spending of 26,600 million of euros, in 2006, to 20,900 million of euros in the 2007 annual budget. 
Regarding personnel, Italian Armed forces decreased from 307,000 troops in 2006 to 184,318 in 
2012. It could be consider that one of the most critical issues in Italy’s Defence structure are the 
personnel costs, which represented 77% of the total defence expenditure in 2013
23
. Therefore, in 2012, 
                                                     
22
 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Sipri Yearbook 2012 Armaments, Disarmament and International 
Security. Oxford University Press, 2012, p.177. 
23
 NATO Public Diplomacy Division, Financial and Economic Data Relating to NATO Defence. Communique 
PR/CP(2014)028, 24 February 2014. 
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the Italian government undertook a rationalization process of defence expenditures, with the proposal 
of a major cut of 30,000 military for the next decade. 
Concerning investment, this rationalization proposal included the postponement of some 
procurement programmes. As an example of the decrease in investment projects, Italy as decided to 
reduce its planned order for F-35 fighter jets, considered one of the world’s costliest defence project, 
from 131 to 90 aircrafts
24
, although the country is still the second largest EU partner in this 
transatlantic programme, after the UK. Other major multinational procurement programmes – 
including Eurofighter, NH90 and FREMM – have not yet been reviewed25. 
Regarding international missions, Italy has tried to maintain its commitments intact so far. It 
maintained an average commitment of 6,700 military in peacekeeping operations in 2010-2012, being 
its main missions ISAF (Afghanistan), UNIFIL (Lebanon) and KFOR (Kosovo)
26
. 
Italy 
 
  2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Defence Spending 
(millions) 
26 964 26 631 20 932 22 631 21 946 21 637 21 741 20 600 
Number in Armed Forces 324 984 307 000 195 268 186 956 192 186 191 231 190 113 184 318 
Investment (millions)   2 351 2 936 3 302 2 545 3 140 2 546 1 828 
Military peace operations 8 425 6 748 7 951 5 047 7 884 6 790 7 744 6512 
Source: Information gathered by the authors according to the European Defence Agency (EDA) Defence Data Portal, 
available at http://www.eda.europa.eu/info-hub/defence-data-portal. 
                                                     
24
 Bloomberg, ‘Italy Slashes Lockheed Martin F-35 Order in Defense Shakeup’. Feb 15, 2012, viewed on 19 June 2013. 
Available at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-02-15/italy-to-cut-f-35-fighter-jet-orders-as-part-of-defense-
revamp.html. 
25
 The Italian example shows the impact of having a large national defence industry. Italy sacrifices the F-35 program, but 
retains the FREMM Frigate program and the NH-90, where it’s industry (Finnmecanica and Ficantieri) is heavily 
involved. 
26
 The Military Balance 2013: The Annual Assessment of Global Military Capabilities and Defence Economics. 
Oxfordshire: Routledge, 2013. 
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Greece 
Greece was the second-biggest defence spender among the 27 NATO countries, after the United 
States. It had also one of the highest ‘military burden’ in the EU, until 2011 more than 2% of its GDP, 
with a military budget in 2012 of 3,272 million euros (compared with 6,200 million euros in 2008). 
Greece’s particular geostrategic context contributed to this fact. With long-running tensions with 
Turkey
27
 (nevertheless the relations between the two countries have improved in recent years), Greece 
has a strategic position in the Mediterranean – with an extensive Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and 
the need to control thousands of islands and porous borders regarding illegal immigration and 
organised crime –, as well as the need to promote stability in the Balkans, Black Sea and Eastern 
Mediterranean.  
The Greek defence budget for 2012 showed a 16% fall in nominal terms, compared with the 
previous year, with further cuts planned in coming years as part of the austerity package
28
. Since the 
beginning of the crisis, Greece had decreased its military expenditure in around 40%.
29
 
Regarding personnel, the Armed Forces were also being restructured. The definition of cuts on 
personnel started with the approval, in the end of 2003
30
, of the new force structure for the 2005-2020, 
predicting a reduction in military from 178,500 to 142,000, mainly in the Army. Although, the 
definition of the force structure was reviewed every five years and major cuts were made in the 
number of troops, being from 133,700 in 2008 to 109,070 in 2012. More than 70% of Greek budget is 
devoted for personnel costs alone. Furthermore, military and civilian personnel account around 2.5% 
                                                     
27
 Namely the Aegean Sea disputes (a complex of maritime, air, territorial and boundary disputes) and the conflict 
regarding Cyprus. 
28
 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Sipri Yearbook 2012 Armaments, Disarmament and International 
Security. Oxford University Press, 2012, p.176. 
29
 The Military Balance 2013: The Annual Assessment of Global Military Capabilities and Defence Economics. 
Oxfordshire: Routledge, 2014, p. 63. 
30
 It should be highlighted that in 2001 Greece ended the state of war and mobilization of the Armed Forces resulting from 
the 1974 Turkish invasion of Cyprus. 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Defence Spending (millions) 26 964 26 631 20 932 22 631 21 946 21 637 21 741 20 600
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Investment (millions) 2 351 2 936 3 302 2 545 3 140 2 546 1 828
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Military peace operations 8 425 6 748 7 951 5 047 7 884 6 790 7 744 6512
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Number in Armed Forces 324 984 307 000 195 268 186 956 192 186 191 231 190 113 184 318
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of Greece’s total labour force, spending more on its soldiers, as a proportion of its economy, than any 
other EU member-state 
31
. 
In what concerns international missions, the number of troops abroad was also reduced from 2,400 
in 2008 to 1,320 in 2012. It should be highlighted that the major Greek military contingent is in 
Cyprus, with a total of 1,150 troops. Greece has reduced the number of troops in other international 
missions, namely ISAF (Afghanistan, from 137 troops in 2008 to 3 in 2012), EUFOR (Bosnia-
Herzegovina, from 45 troops in 2008 to 2 in 2012), KFOR (Kosovo, from 744 troops in 2008 to 120 in 
2012) and UNIFIL (Lebanon, from 192 troops in 2008 to 57 in 2012). 
Considering investment, between 2003 and 2007 Greece was one of the fourth-largest arms 
importers
32
, behind China, India and United Arab Emirates. The Greek purchase of new military 
equipment reaches particularly high values for the average of the EU countries (around 30% of the 
total defence expenditure), being France and Germany among of the main suppliers
33
. The 2011-2015 
Arms Procurement Plan has been reduced by 70%, in comparison with the previous 2006-2020 
prospects
34
. 
Greece 
 
  2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Defence Spending 
(millions) 
4 956 5 240 5 579 6 192 6 023 4 756 3 604 3 272 
Number in Armed Forces 139 809 138 994 134 759 133 775 133 385 124 266 116 970 109 070 
Investment (millions)   1 500 1 707 2 140 2 133 1 148 300 327 
Military peace operations 2 740 3 141 2 313 2 427 1 985 2 065 1 920 1320 
Source: Information gathered by the authors according to the European Defence Agency (EDA) Defence Data Portal, 
available at http://www.eda.europa.eu/info-hub/defence-data-portal. 
                                                     
31
 NATO Public Diplomacy Division, Financial and Economic Data Relating to NATO Defence. Communique 
PR/CP(2014)028, 24 February 2014. 
32
 Until 2006, part of the Greek procurement expenditure was made under a legal and financial framework that allowed its 
non-inclusion in the public debt. 
33
 According to SIPRI, from 2000 to 2011, Germany accounted for 23% of Greece’s total arms imports, next to the United 
Stated and ahead of France, which was third, with at 12% of total. 
34
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Sipri Yearbook 2012 Armaments, Disarmament and 
International Security. Oxford University Press, 2012, p.176. 
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According to this brief analysis, since 2008 there is a widespread cut in Southern European countries’ 
military spending, which mainly results from the economic crisis environment and the implementation 
of national austerity policies. This decrease implies not only a reduction in manpower, but also a 
decline in the investment – with consequences on the modernization and acquisition of new military 
capabilities – and a restraint in the participation in international peacekeeping missions. 
Since this trend is not likely to be changed in a short term, and may even be aggravated, it can be 
expected consequences at two levels. At the national level, a more careful definition of the Security 
and Defence policy’s priorities regarding strategic objectives and international cooperation, either in 
terms of force generation and investment projects. At the international level, a more limited disposal 
from the southern European countries to assume international military commitments within the 
organizations in which they participate (namely UN, NATO and EU), with obvious consequences to 
their role as international security providers. 
Way out? Permanent structured cooperation or sub-regional defence cooperation 
Despite national particularities, the four southern European countries under austerity policies show 
similar trends regarding the Defence and Armed Forces sector. 
The first trend is the decline in Defence expenditure. With the exception of Portugal, all other 
southern European countries have reduced their defence expenditure, in real terms, in the last five 
years. Second, there is an overall reduction in manpower, both civilian and military. Although there is 
an international trend for a reduction in manpower – resulting, among other reasons, from 
technological change, adjustment and modernization of the force structure and private sector 
contracting –, this tendency in the Southern European countries results, mainly, from economic crisis. 
A third trend is the decrease of investment, procurement and R&D. All Southern European countries 
froze or suspended some of their military modernization programmes, although with differences 
between the countries whose defence industries have an important impact on national economies (Italy 
and Spain) and the others (Portugal and Greece). Finally, there is a reduction of military peacekeeping 
deployments. All Southern European countries have decreased the number of troops in international 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Defence Spending (millions) 4 956 5 240 5 579 6 192 6 023 4 756 3 604 3 272
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Investment (millions) 1 500 1 707 2 140 2 133 1 148 300 327
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Military peace operations 8 425 6 748 7 951 5 047 7 884 6 790 7 744 6512
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Military peace operations 2 740 3 141 2 313 2 427 1 985 2 065 1 920 1320
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11 
missions, which had consequences on these countries contribution to international operations, both at 
NATO and EU level, also reducing their role as international security providers. 
The economic crisis, the austerity, the reduction of military expenditure and the downgrading of 
the political priority given to Defence can only be overcome by taking the context of crisis as an 
opportunity. And if this is true for the European Union as an all, is even truer for Southern Europe. 
That could be done at two levels. At the national level, through the promotion of structural reforms 
of the Defence and Armed Forces that allow to maintain the same level of ambition, but with 
optimizing resources. In other words, doing more with less. This would mean an improvement of the 
ratio between support and operational military, a rationalization of the resources available and a more 
balanced budgetary structure, reducing personnel cost and increasing investment, R&D and 
operations/maintenance expenditure. The major objective should be more deployable Armed Forces, 
capable to respond to the current security and defence environment. 
But the current economic and financial crisis should also constitute an opportunity to deepen the 
Defence cooperation between EU member-states.  
At the European level, with the overall decrease of defence expenditures, European Defence 
cooperation should be seen as the better way to improve capabilities in any level of spending, 
particularly regarding investment and force generation. In terms of investment, the path chosen by the 
EU member-states since 2010, at the Ghent framework, was ‘pooling and sharing’35. This process is 
based on bilateral or multilateral initiatives among member-states, but outside the decision-making 
processes in CSDP framework, as defined in the Lisbon Treaty, namely the ‘permanent structured 
cooperation’36.  
The ‘pooling and sharing’ project is a step in the right direction, but a long-term process, which has 
yielded so far little or no practical results. In this sense, for the success of ‘pooling and sharing’ 
enterprise, some pre-conditions are needed: first, all member-states that show political will to 
participate should be included; second, those who are willing to participate should do it within the 
CSDP institutional framework. If both conditions were fulfilled, and in order to be a real EU security 
and defence outcome, there would be no substantial difference between ‘pooling and sharing’ and the 
‘permanent structured cooperation’, as a specific cooperation mechanism for CSDP, as defined in the 
Lisbon Treaty.
 37
  
However, if the option of a ‘permanent structured cooperation’, with a truly common nature, would 
not be politically viable in the current context, the European countries could adopt, at least, 
mechanisms of sub-regional security and defence cooperation. Based on the Nordic Defence 
Cooperation example, European countries, namely in Southern Europe, should promote the 
enhancement of political discussions regarding cooperative ownership of defence equipment, 
investment and R&D partnerships, strengthening of joint training or even conducting joint missions. 
This would result in the creation of ‘mini-defence unions’38 that would promote, from a sub-regional 
basis, the strengthening of an European defence. 
                                                     
35
 Cf. Biscop, Sven& Coelmont, Jo, Pooling & Sharing: from Slow March to Quick March? Egmont Security Policy Brief 
No. 23, May 2011; Giegerich, Bastian, Budget Crunch: Implications for European Defence. Survival. 52 (4), 2010. 
36
 Cf. Article 42 (6) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU).  
37
 Cf. Teixeira, Nuno Severiano, European Defense: Past Legacy, Present Changes, Future Challenges. EUI Working 
Papers RSCAS 2012/03, January 2012. 
38
 Ojanen, Hanna, Nordic Defence Cooperation – Inspiration For The EU or a Lesson in Matching Expectations?. TEPSA 
Policy Paper, February 2014. 
